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Abstract—In this paper, a novel steganographic scheme
based on chaotic iterations is proposed. This research work
takes place into the information hiding security framework.
The applications for anonymity and privacy through the
Internet are regarded too. To guarantee such an anonymity, it
should be possible to set up a secret communication channel
into a web page, being secure. To achieve this goal, we propose
an information hiding scheme being stego-secure, which is
the highest level of security in a well defined and studied
category of attacks called “watermark-only attack”. This
category of attacks is the best context to study steganography-
based anonymity through the Internet. The steganalysis of our
steganographic process is also studied in order to show its
security in a real test framework.
Keywords-Privacy; Internet; Steganography; Security;
Chaotic iterations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In common opinion or for non specialists, anonymity
through the Internet is only desirable for malicious use.
A frequent thought is that individuals who search or use
anonymity tools have something wrong or shameful to hide.
Thus, as privacy and anonymity software as proxy or Tor [1]
are only used by terrorists, pedophiles, weapon merchants,
and so on, such tools should be forbidden. However, ter-
rorism or pedophilia existed in the absence of the Internet.
Furthermore, recent actualities recall to us that, in numerous
places around the world, to have an opinion that diverges
from the one imposed by political or religious leaders is
something considered as negative, suspicious, or illegal.
For instance, Saudi blogger Hamza Kashgari jailed, may
face execution after tweets about Muhammad. Generally
speaking, the so-called Arab Spring, and current fighting and
uncertainty in Syria, have taught to us the following facts.
First, the Internet is a media of major importance, which is
difficult to arrest or to silence, bearing witness to the need for
democracy, transparency, and efforts to combat corruption.
Second, claiming his/her opinions, making journalism or
politics, is dangerous in various states, and can lead to the
death penalty (as for numerous Iranian bloggers: Hossein
Derakhshan [2], Vahid Asghari, etc.).
Considering that the freedom of expression is a fundamen-
tal right that must be protected, that journalists must be able
to inform the community without risking their own lives,
and that to be a defender of human rights can be dangerous,
various software have emerged these last decades to preserve
anonymity or privacy through the Internet. Excepting of the
Mix-Network principle [3], the most famous tool of this kind
is probably Tor, the onion router. Tor client software routes
Internet traffic through a worldwide volunteer network of
servers, in order to conceal a user’s location or usage from
anyone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis.
Another example of this kind is given by Perseus [4], a
firefox plugin that protect personal data, without infringing
any national crypto regulations, and that preserve the true
needs of national security. Perseus replaces cryptography
by coding theory techniques, such that only agencies with
a strong enough computer power can eavesdrop traffic in
an acceptable amount of time. Finally, anonymous proxy
servers around the world can help to keep machines behind
them anonymous: the destination server (the server that
ultimately satisfies the web request) receives requests from
the anonymizing proxy server, and thus does not receive
information about the end user’s address.
These three solutions are not without flaws. For in-
stance, when considering anonymizers, the requests are not
anonymous to the anonymizing proxy server, which simply
moves the problem on: are these proxy servers worthy of
trust? Perseus can be broken with enough computer power.
And due to its central position and particular conception,
Tor is targeted by numerous attacks and presents various
weaknesses (bad apple attack, or the fact that Tor cannot
protect against monitoring of traffic at the boundaries of the
Tor network).
Considering these flaws, and because having a variety of
solutions to provide anonymity is a good rule of thumb, a
steganographic approach is often regarded in that context [5].
Steganography can be applied in several ways to preserve
anonymity through the Internet, encompassing the creation
of secret channels through background images of websites,
into Facebook photo galleries, on audio or video streams, or
in non-interpreted characters in HTML source codes. The
authors’ intention is not to describe precisely these well-
known techniques, but to explain how to evaluate their se-
curity. They applied it on a new algorithm of steganography
based on chaotic iterations and data embedding in least
significant coefficients. This state-of-the-art in information
hiding security is organized as follows.
In Section II, some basic reminders concerning both
mathematical notions and notations, and the Most and Least
Significant Coefficients are given. Our new steganographic
process called DI3 which is suitable to guarantee anonymity
of data for privacy on the Internet is presented in Section III.
In Section IV, a reminder about information hiding security
is realized. The attacks classification in a steganographic
framework are given, and the level of security of DI3 is
studied. In the next section the security of our new scheme
is evaluated. Then, in Section- VI the steganalysis of the
proposed process is realized, and it is compared with other
steganographic schemes in the literature. This research work
ends by a conclusion section, where our contribution is
summarized and intended future researches are presented.
II. BASIC REMINDERS
A. Mathematical definitions and notations
Let Sn denotes the nth term of a sequence S, and Vi
the ith component of a vector V . For a, b ∈ N, we use the
following notation: Ja; bK = {a, a+ 1, a+ 2, . . . , b}.
Definition 1: Let k ∈ N∗. The set of all sequences which
elements belong into J1; kK, called strategy adapters onJ1; kK, is denoted by Sk. 
Definition 2: The support of a finite sequence S of n terms
is the finite set S (S) =
{
Sk, k < n
}
containing all the
distinct values of S. Its cardinality is s.t. #S (S) 6 n. 
Definition 3: A finite sequence S ∈ SN of n terms is
injective if n = #S (S). It is onto if N = #S (S). Finally,
it is bijective if and only if it is both injective and onto, so
n = N = #S (S). 
Remark 1: On the one hand, “S is injective” reflects the
fact that all the n terms of the sequence S are distinct. On
the other hand, “S is onto” means that all the values of the
set J1;NK are reached at least once. 
B. The Most and Least Significant Coefficients
We first notice that terms of the original content x that
may be replaced by terms issued from the watermark y are
less important than other: they could be changed without be
perceived as such. More generally, a signification function
attaches a weight to each term defining a digital media,
depending on its position t.
Definition 4: A signification function is a real sequence
(uk)k∈N. 
Example 1: Let us consider a set of grayscale images
stored into portable graymap format (P3-PGM): each pixel
ranges between 256 gray levels, i.e., is memorized with eight
bits. In that context, we consider uk = 8−(k mod 8) to be
the k-th term of a signification function (uk)k∈N. Intuitively,
in each group of eight bits (i.e., for each pixel) the first bit
has an importance equal to 8, whereas the last bit has an
importance equal to 1. This is compliant with the idea that
changing the first bit affects more the image than changing
the last one. 
Definition 5: Let (uk)k∈N be a signification function, m
and M be two reals s.t. m < M .
• The most significant coefficients (MSCs) of x is the
finite vector
uM =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈ N and uk >M and k ≤| x |) ;
• The least significant coefficients (LSCs) of x is the finite
vector
um =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈ N and uk ≤ m and k ≤| x |) ;
• The passive coefficients of x is the finite vector
up =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈ N and uk ∈]m;M [ and k ≤| x |) .
For a given host content x, MSCs are then ranks of x
that describe the relevant part of the image, whereas LSCs
translate its less significant parts.
Example 2: These two definitions are illustrated on Fig-
ure 1, where the significance function (uk) is defined as in
Example 1, m = 5, and M = 6.
(a) Original Lena.
(b) MSCs of Lena. (c) LSCs of Lena (×17).
Figure 1. Most and least significant coefficients of Lena.
Using the concept described in this section, it is now
possible to expose our new steganographic scheme.
III. THE NEW PROCESS: DI3
In this section, a new algorithm, which is inspired from the
scheme CIS2 described in [6], is presented. Unlike CIS2
which require embedding keys with three strategies, only
one is required for DI3. Thus it is easyer to implement
for Internet applications, especially in order to guarantee
anonymization. Moreover, because in DI3 there is no op-
eration to mix the message, this new scheme seems to be
faster than CIS2, which is a major advantage to have fast
response times on the Internet.
Let us firstly introduce the following notations. P ∈ N∗
is the width, in term of bits, of the message to embed into
the cover media. λ ∈ N∗ is the number of iterations to
realize, which is s.t. λ > P. The initial state x0 ∈ BN is
for the N LSCs of a given cover media C supposed to be
uniformly distributed. m ∈ BP is the message to hide into
x0. Finally, S ∈ SP is a strategy such that the finite sequence{
Sk, k ∈ Jλ− P+ 1;λK} is injective.
Remark 2: The width P of the message to hide into the
LSCs of the cover media x0 has to be far smaller than the
number of LSCs. 
The proposed information hiding scheme is defined by
an iterative process applied on LSCs of the cover media as
follow:
Definition 6 (DI3 Data hiding scheme):
∀(n, i) ∈ N∗ × J0;N− 1K:
xni =
{
xn−1i if S
n 6= i
mSn if Sn = i.

The stego-content is the Boolean vector y = xλ ∈ BN,
which will replace the former LSCs (LSCs of the cover
media are replaced by the vector y).
Remark 3: The implementation of this data hiding scheme
is exposed in a complementary work [7]. 
IV. DATA HIDING SECURITY AND ROBUSTNESS
A. Security and robustness
Even if security and robustness are neighboring concepts
without clearly established definitions [8], robustness is
often considered to be mostly concerned with blind ele-
mentary attacks, whereas security is not limited to certain
specific attacks. Indeed, security encompasses robustness
and intentional attacks [9], [10]. The best attempt to give an
elegant and concise definition for each of these two terms
was proposed in [9]. Following Kalker, we will consider in
this research work the two following definitions:
Definition 7 (Security [9]): Watermarking security refers
to the inability by unauthorized users to have access to
the raw watermarking channel [...] to remove, detect and
estimate, write or modify the raw watermarking bits. 
Figure 2. Simmons’ prisoner problem [11]
Definition 8 (Robustness [9]): Robust watermarking is a
mechanism to create a communication channel that is mul-
tiplexed into original content [...] It is required that, firstly,
the perceptual degradation of the marked content [...] is
minimal and, secondly, that the capacity of the watermark
channel degrades as a smooth function of the degradation
of the marked content. 
In this article, we will focus more specifically on the se-
curity aspects, which have been formalized in the Simmons’
prisoner problem.
B. The prisoner problem
In the prisoner problem of Simmons [11], Alice and Bob
are in jail, and they want to, possibly, devise an escape plan
by exchanging hidden messages in innocent-looking cover
contents (Fig. 2). These messages are to be conveyed to
one another by a common warden, Eve, who over-drops all
contents and can choose to interrupt the communication if
they appear to be stego-contents.
C. Classification of Attacks
In the steganography framework, in the Simmons’ pris-
oner problem context, attacks have been classified in [12]
as follows.
Definition 9 (Classes of attacks):
WOA: A Watermark-Only Attack occurs when an attacker
has only access to several watermarked contents.
KMA: A Known-Message Attack occurs when an attacker
has access to several pairs of watermarked con-
tents and corresponding hidden messages.
KOA: A Known-Original Attack is when an attacker has
access to several pairs of watermarked contents
and their corresponding original versions.
CMA: A Constant-Message Attack occurs when the at-
tacker observes several watermarked contents and
only knows that the unknown hidden message is
the same in all contents. 
A synthesis of this classification is given in Table I.
In this article, we will focus more specifically on the
“Watermark-Only Attack” situation, which is the most rel-
evant category when considering anonymity and privacy
protection through the Internet.
Class Original content Stego content Hidden message
WOA ×
KMA × ×
KOA × ×
CMA ×
Table I
WATERMARKING ATTACKS CLASSIFICATION IN CONTEXT OF [9]
D. Reminder about Stego-Security
The stego-security, defined in the Watermark-Only Attack
(WOA) framework, is the highest security level that can be
defined in this setup [12].
Definition 10 (Stego-Security): Let K be the set of em-
bedding keys, p(X) the probabilistic model of N0 initial
host contents, and p(Y |K1) the probabilistic model of N0
watermarked contents. Moreover, each host content has been
watermarked with the same secret key K1 and the same
embedding function e. Then e is said stego-secure if:
∀K1 ∈ K, p(Y |K1) = p(X).
Until now, only three schemes have been proven stego-
secure. On the one hand, the authors of [12] have established
that the spread spectrum technique called Natural Water-
marking is stego-secure when its distortion parameter η is
equal to 1. On the other hand, we have proposed in [13]
and [6] two other data hiding schemes satisfying this security
property.
V. SECURITY STUDY
Let us prove that,
Proposition 1: DI3 is stego-secure. 
Proof: Let us suppose that x0 ∼ U (BN), m ∼ U (BP),
and S ∼ U (SP) in a DI3 setup, where U(X) describes the
uniform distribution on X . We will prove by a mathematical
induction that ∀n ∈ N, xn ∼ U (BN). The base case is
obvious according to the uniform repartition hypothesis.
Let us now suppose that the statement xn ∼ U (BN) holds
for some n ( P (xn = k) = 1
2N
).
For a given k ∈ BN , we denote by k˜i ∈ BN the vector
defined by:
∀i ∈ J0;N− 1K, if k = (k0, k1, . . . , ki, . . . , kN−2, kN−1),
then k˜i =
(
k0, k1, . . . , ki, . . . , kN−2, kN−1
)
, where x is the
negation of the bit x.
Let p be defined by: p = P
(
xn+1 = k
)
. Let Ej and
E be the events defined by: ∀j ∈ J0;P− 1K, Ej = (xn =
k˜j)∧(Sn = j)∧(mSn = kj),E = (xn = k)∧(mSn = xSn).
So, p = P
(
E ∨∨N−1j=0 Ej) .
On the one hand, ∀j ∈ J0;P− 1K, the event Ej is a
conjunction of the sub-events (Sn = j) and other sub-
events. ∀j ∈ J0;P− 1K, all the sub-events (Sn = j) are
clearly pairwise disjoints, so all the evente Ej are pairwise
disjoints too.
On the other hand, ∀j ∈ J0;P− 1K, the events Ej and E
are disjoints, because in Ej , a conjunction of the sub-event
(xn = k˜j) with other sub-events appears, whereas in E a
conjunction of the sub-event (xn = k) with other sub-events
appears, and the two sub-events (xn = k˜j) and (xn = k)
are clearly disjoints.
As a consequence, using the probability law concerning
the reunion of disjoint events we can claim that: p = P (E)+∑N
j=0 P (Ej).
Now we evaluate both P (E) and P (Ej).
1) The case of P (E): As the two events (xn = k) and
(mSn = xSn) concern two different sequences, they
are clearly independent.
Then, by using the inductive hypothesis: P (xn = k) =
1
2N
. So,
p(E) = P (xn = k)× P (mSn = xSn)
= 1
2N
× [P (mSn = 0)P (xSn = 0)
+ P (mSn = 1)P (xSn = 1)]
= 1
2N
× [P (mSn = 0)P (xSn = 0)
+P (mSn = 1)(1− P (xSn = 0))]
= 1
2N
× [ 12P (xSn = 0) + 12 (1− P (xSn = 0))]
= 1
2N+1
.
2) Evaluation of P (Ej): As the three events (xn = k˜j),
(Sn = j), and (mn = kj) deal with three different
sequences, they are clearly independent. So
P (Ej) = P (x
n = k˜j)× P (Sn = j)× P (mSn = kj)
= 1
2N
× 1P × 12
= 1P × 12N+1 ,
due to the hypothesis of uniform repartition of S and m.
Consequently, p = P (E) +
∑P
j=0 P (Ej)
= 1
2N+1
+
∑P
j=0
(
1
P × 12N+1
)
= 1
2N
.
Finally, P
(
xn+1 = k
)
= 1
2N
, which leads to xn+1 ∼
U
(
BN
)
. This result is true ∀n ∈ N, we thus have proven
that the stego-content y is uniformly distributed in the set of
possible stego-contents: y ∼ U (BN) when x ∼ U (BN) .
Remark 4 (Distribution of LSCs): We have supposed
that x0 ∼ U (BN) to prove the stego-security of the data
hiding process DI3. This hypothesis is the most restrictive
one, but it can be obtained at least partially in two possible
manners. Either a channel that appears to be random (for
instance, when applying a chi squared test) can be found
in the media. Or a systematic process can be applied on
the images to obtain this uniformity, as follows. Before
embedding the hidden message, all the original LSCs must
be replaced by randomly generated ones, hoping so that
such cover media will be considered to be noisy by any
given attacker.
Let us remark that, in the field of data anonymity for
privacy on the Internet, we are in the “watermark-only
attack” framework. As it has been recalled in Table I,
in that framework, the attacker has only access to stego-
contents, having so no knowledge of the original media,
before introducing the message in the random channel
(LSCs). However, this assumption of the existence of a
random channel, natural or artificial, into the cover images,
is clearly the most disputable one of this research work.
The authors’ intention is to investigate such hypothesis more
largely in future works, by investigation the distribution
of several LSCs contained in a large variety of images
chosen randomly on the Internet. Among other things, we
will check if some well-defined LSCs are naturally uniformly
distributed in most cases. To conduct such studies, we intend
to use the well-known NIST (National Institute of Standards
and Technology of the U.S. Government) tests suite, the
DieHARD battery, or the stringent TestU01 [14]. Depending
on the results of this search for randomness in natural
images, the need to introduce an artificial random channel
could be possibly removed. 
Remark 5 (Distribution of the messages m): In order to
prove the stego-security of the data hiding process DI3,
we have supposed that m ∼ U (BP). This hypothesis is
not really restrictive. Indeed, to encrypt the message before
its embedding into the LSCs of cover media if sufficient to
achieve this goal. To say it different, in order to be in the
conditions of applications of the process DI3, the hidden
message must be encrypted. 
Remark 6 (Distribution of the strategies S): To prove
the stego-security of the data hiding process DI3, we
have finally supposed that S ∼ U (SP). This hypothesis
is not restrictive too, as any cryptographically secure
pseudorandom generator (PRNG) satisfies this property.
With such PRNGs, it is impossible in polynomial time, to
make the distinction between random numbers and numbers
provided by these generators. For instance, Blum Blum
Shub (BBS) [15], Blum Goldwasser (BG), or ISAAC, are
convenient here. 
VI. STEGANALYSIS
The steganographic scheme detailed along these lines has
been compared to state of the art steganographic approaches,
namely YASS [16], HUGO [17], and nsF5 [18].
The steganalysis is based on the BOSS image
database [19] which consists in a set of 10 000 512x512
greyscale images. We randomly selected 50 of them to
compute the cover set. Since YASS and nsF5 are dedicated
to JPEG support, all these images have been firstly translated
into JPEG format thanks to the mogrify command line. To
allow the comparison between steganographic schemes, the
relative payload is always set with 0.1 bit per pixel. Under
that constrain, the embedded message m is a sequence of
26214 randomly generated bits. This step has led to distin-
guish four sets of stego contents, one for each steganographic
approach.
Next we use the steganalysis tool developed by the
HugoBreakers team [20] based on AI classifier and which
won the BOSS competition [19]. Table II summarizes these
steganalysis results expressed as the error probabilities of
the steganalyser. The errors are the mean of the false alarms
and of the missed detections. An error that is closed to 0.5
signifies that deciding whether an image contains a stego
content is a random choice for the steganalyser. Conversely,
a tiny error denotes that the steganalyser can easily classify
stego content and non stego content.
Steganographic Tool DI3 YASS HUGO NsF5
Error Probability 0.4133 0.0067 0.495 0.47
Table II
STEGANALYSIS RESULTS OF HUGOBREAKERS STEGANALYSER
The best result is obtained by HUGO, which is closed
to the perfect steganographic approach to the considered
steganalyser, since the error is about 0.5. However, even
if the approach detailed along these lines has not any opti-
mization, these first experiments show promising results. We
finally notice that the HugoBreakers’s steganalyser should
outperform these results on larger image databases, e.g.,
when applied on the whole BOSS image database.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Steganography is a real alternative to guarantee anonymity
through the Internet. Unlike the principle of onion routers or
Mix-networks, such a protocol using steganography doesn’t
require any third party potentially corrupted. Only the two
parties who want to anonymously communicate are involved
in the protocol. Each one holds a secret key for embedding
and extraction of the message in the cover media. So to
guaranty the anonymity of the communication, only the
stealth and the undetectability of the message is required. It
is assured by the security of the steganographic process. For
instance, the scheme presented in this article offers a secure
solution to achieve this goal, thanks to its stego-security.
Even if this new scheme DI3 does not possess topological
properties (unlike the CIS2), its level of security seems to be
sufficient for Internet applications. Indeed, we take place into
the Watermark Only Attack (WOA) framework, where stego-
security is the highest level of security. Additionally, this
new scheme is faster than CIS2. This is a major advantage
for an utilization through the Internet, to respect response
times of web sites. Moreover, for this first version of the
process, the steganalysis results are promising.
In future work, various improvements of this scheme are
planed to obtain better scores against steganalysers. For
instance, LSCs will be embedded into various frequency
domains. The robustness of the proposed scheme will be
evaluated too [21], to determine whether this information
hiding algorithm can be relevant in other Internet domains
interesting by data hiding techniques, as the semantic web.
Finally a cryptographic approach of information hiding
security is currently investigated, enlarging the Simmons’
prisoner problem [22], and we intend to evaluate the pro-
posed scheme in this framework.
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